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INJURIES TO INFANTS EN VENTRE SA MERE
By A. B. FREY*
The philosopher, Zeno, confounded his contemporaries with the in-
quiry: "Where is an arrow when it flies through the air ?" There was
no doubt, to those who believed in the reality of things as such, that
the arrow was actually there, since this fact was attested by the senses.
At the same time, by reason of the fact that the arrow did not appear to
be stationary at any particular place, great energy was expended and
much learning wasted on the learned philosopher's inquiry.
In the same way, when the question has come before the Courts
during the past century as to whether or not there is a right of recovery
for injuries to infants en ventre sa miere, serious discussions have taken
place as to the status of such infants.
Some Courts have declared with much show of learning that al-
though such infants may inherit real property, as individuals and as in-
dependent personalities, yet in cases which constitute the subject of this
paper, such infants are, in fact, merely a part of the mother and are non-
existent in the eyes of the law. Other Courts have held that while it is
a crime, punishable by various severe penalties, to bring about the death
of such infants, since the wrong-doer has attacked society by taking
human life, yet, so far as the civil rights of the infants or their repre-
sentatives (who have suffered by the wrong done) is concerned, that is
quite another question-since infants en ventre sa mere were not human
beings at the time they were destroyed or injured.
It is the aim of the law to be consistent. More than this, it is the
purpose of the law that for every substantial injury to human life or
limb the wrong-doer shall make substantial restitution. The law ab-
*Judge of Circuit Court, St. Louis, Missouri.
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hors an invasion of human rights without permitting a recovery there-
for. Since, accordingly, this involves a question of human life and
human rights and is, as well, a challenge to the boast of the law that it
seeks to be reasonable as well as just, this question ought to be of inter-
est to the Courts which hold the scales of justice, to the advocate who is
advancing the rights of his client in the Courts, as well as of academic
interest to the student who is curious to trace the growth and develop-
ment of the law.
If we turn for a moment from the law to the science of biology we
find that we are told that when the spermatoz6on (of the male) comes
in contact with the ovum (of the female) in the womb of zygote is
formed by the junction of the two into one cell and that a human em-
bryo springs into being in from one to two weeks. By the end of the
third month this type of life is then termed a foetus, and upon the first
movement that is actually felt (which usually takes place before the
end of the fourth month) there is said to be a quickening of the child.
It is considered highly unethical for any physician to take any steps
whatever to retard the growth or development of the zygote from the
time of its inception, except if necessary to save the life or health of
the mother. Every right-thinking physician will promptly advise the
inquirer that he regards the embryo and foetus as sacred, since it is
human-life in its first stage. More than this, methods of preventing
conception have also been frowned upon by the medical profession.
Laws have been enacted prohibiting the dissemination of information
of contraceptive methods.
Adverting now to the law we find that at the early common law, in
order to constitute the crime of Abortion, it was necessary to charge
that the woman was quick with child, but this is no longer true; under
our statutes, unless they specifically make quickening an essential ele-
ment of the offense.'
Moreover at the common law the commentator in Cyc. says:
It was not homicide to kill an unborn child, even after it had
quickened.2
Blackstone, however, does not so state the law, for he says:
The right of personal security consists in a person's legal and un-
interrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body and his repu-
tation. Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by
nature in every individual; and it means, in contemplation of law,
as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb. For, if
a woman is quick with child, and, by a potion or otherwise, killeth
'I C. J. Par. 45. -21 Cyc. 662.
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it in her womb, or if any one beat her, whereby the child dieth in
her body and she is delivered of a dead child, this, although not
murder, was, by the ancient law, homicide or manslaughter.3
While I haven't taken the time to examine all of the statutes on this
subject, the rule seems to be in most jurisdictions that it is now man-
slaughter to bring about the death of an unborn child.
Again, at the common law, when the body of the child had been de-
livered and an independent circulation was established-even while the
child was still attached to the mother by the umbilical cord-the one re-
sponsible for its death was guilty of homicide, although the death was
caused by injuries inflicted before the birth of the child.4  The statutes
of many of the states, however, have gone much farther than the com-
mon law towards increasing the gravity of the offense of killing the
infant en ventre sa nere. For example, in Missouri, it is manslaughter
to produce or promote a miscarriage or abortion which results in the
death of a quick child.3 And it is likewise manslaughter to wilfully
kill an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother of such child,
provided the act would have been murder if it had resulted in the death
of the mother. 6
Turning now to the subject of property rights of the unborn child,
we find that an infant en ventre sa mere was regarded at the common
law as "in esse" from the time of its conception for the purpose of
taking any estate, whether by descent or devise or under the statute of
distribution, if the infant was born alive after such a period of ex-
istence that its continuance in life was or might be reasonably expected.7
Amplifying this somewhat, we find in the case of Doe v. Clarke,8 it was
held:
That wherever such consideration would be for his benefit, a child
en ventre sa mere should be considered as absolutely born.
Again, in Goodtitle v. Wood,9 there is a note to the effect that there
is no difference between such a child and one actually born. In Marcel-
lis v. Thalheimer,0 Chancellor Walsworth states the rule to be:
It is at this day a well settled rule of law relative to successions
and to most other cases in relation to infants that a child en ventre
sa mere, as to every purpose where it is to the benefit of the child,
is to be considered in esse.
' BLACKSTON COMMEN. 129-139.
'21 Cyc. 662.
aR S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 3239.
'R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 3238.
'10 AM. & ENG. ENCY. OF LAW, p. 624.
'2 H. B1. 399.
'7 T. R 99.
" 2 Paige 39.
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If we turn now from this preliminary discussion to the question of
the rights of such an infant with reference to the laws of personal in-
jury, we immediately find ourselves enmeshed in a maze of legal con-
tradictions. This question came indirectly before our Supreme Court
in the case of Kirk v. Middlebrook,' in which the opinion was written
by our learned jurist, Judge Lamm. While, what he said on the sub-
ject there is, in large part, obiter, yet it is interesting and highly in-
structive. I quote:
Whether damages flowing from negligent injuries to a quick
child about to be born-that is, ready and about to be severed from
the mother under the mysterious and inexorable laws of nature-
belong to the mother to be contracted away as she elects, or be-
long in the law to the child as a sentient being, is a most formidable,
a most novel and anxious question. Few cases are in the books,
where that question has been up. Under Lord Campbell's Damage
Act it was held that a posthumous child could sue to recover
damages sustained by the death of its father. (The George and
Richard, 3 Ad. and Eccl.. (1 R.) 466). The Supreme Court of
Texas came to a similar conclusion under the statutes of that
State. (Nelson v. Railroad, 78 Tex. I. c. 624, et seq., where an
illuminating discussion may be found. See, also, Railroad v.
Robertson, 82 Tex. 657; 1 Blackstone Com., 129-130; Aubuchon
v. Bender, 44 Mo. I. c. 568, arguendo.) But it has been held that
the common law gives no right of action to an infant for injuries
received by it while en ventre sa mere. (Allaire v. St. Luke's Hos-
pital, 184 Ill. 359; Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14; Walker
v. Railroad, 28 L. R. (Ireland) 69). Of the Allaire case (decided
in two appellate courts) it has been said: 'However, the reasoning
in the support of these decisions is not eminently convincing, and
the dissenting opinions in the most recent case on the subject are
entitled to respectful consideration.' (16 Am. and Eng. Ency. L.
(2ed.) 261.)
Since so capable a jurist as Judge Lamm considered this subject a
novel, interesting and puzzling one, it is certainly worthy of our con-
sideration. It may be well to subdivide the consideration thereof. Per-
haps the easiest way to treat the matter is to group it under the following
heads: (a). Trespass or direct force applied to infants en ventre sa
mere. (b). Case or negligent injuries to such infants. (c). The
rights of actions to the survivors or personal representatives for in-
juries resulting in the death of such infants.
Considering these three phases of the subject in their inverse order,
we find that with respect to the right of action to the survivors or per-
sonal representatives for injuries, either in trespass or case to such in-
'201 Mo. 245.
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fants, resulting in their deaths, the law is settled that there can be no
recovery.
The reasoning in support of this rule is that at common law a cause
of action for personal injuries did not survive if death resulted from
negligence or wrongful act. Lord Campbell Act, enacted in 1846,
(and generally made the basis of our statutory law in this country)
sought to correct this situation. It provides, in substance, that to en-
able the survivor or legal representatives to recover, the act, neglect
or default must have been such as would, if death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages in respect thereof. In some cases the Courts have argued
that since the child (at the common law and under the decisions to be
hereinafter referred to) may not maintain such an action, after its
birth, accordingly such an action will not accrue under the Lord Camp-
bell's Act.12
It goes without saying that the decisions which are based on this the-
ory are logically sound, if the rule is sound that the infants, if born
alive, would have had no right of action for the injury sustained; and,
accordingly, they are unsound if such is not the rule.
On the other hand, there is a group of cases which hold that there
can be no recovery by the survivor or personal representative under the
Lord Campbell's Act for another reason-which is somewhat different:
This latter rule finds expression in the case of Buel v. United Rys. Co. 13
Says the Court, in considering the matter in the light of the Missouri
Statute, modeled after the Lord Campbell's Act:
The only point for review is whether the statute was intended
to provide a penalty for the death of a person after birth, caused
by negligent injuries before its birth. The statute in question, with
some modifications and expansions of its scope and remedies, has
existed in this state for more than fifty years. It was intended
originally to alter the common law rule that an action for a per-
sonal injury abated upon the death of the injured person, and to
provide for the survival of such actions. We have not been able
to find any precedent at common law establishing the right of a child
injured while in ventre sa mere, but subsequently born alive, to
bring an action thereafter for the injuries so received. This being
the purpose of the Legislature, the declaratory act must be inter-
preted in that light and to effectuate that object. When this statute
was passed no case had arisen wherein the right to maintain such
an action had been affirmed.
"2 Gorman v. Budlong, 55 L. R. A. 118; Drobner v. Peters, 230 N. Y. 220;
Dietrich v. Northampton 138 Mass. 14.
"3248 Mo. 126.
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Then, after considering a number of decisions of other jurisdictions,
the Court proceeds with the statement:
It is not necessary to rule upon the rationale of these decisions.
It is enough to say that they demonstrate that by the act in ques-
tion (R. S. 1909, Sec. 5425) the Legislature could not have in-
tended (in view of the law existing or declared at that time) when
it used the terms 'persons so dying' to include a person who died
after birth from injuries recived by its mother prior to its birth.
Such a design on the part of the Legislature would have been out
of keeping with the paramount object of the act to create a sur-
vival of actions which would have lapsed at common law upon the
death of the injured person. For, in the case of a child so injured,
no right of action accrued to such child after its birth by the com-
mon law as it had been then adjudged; and, hence, there was no
prior right to sue, which the statute could take hold of and cause
to survive the death of the person injured. If it had been the
purpose of the statute to create a cause of action which did not
theretofore exist, certainly that intention would have been ex-
pressed in the terms of the act. This was not done at the time of
its enactment or in any of its subsequent amendments. It follows
that the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer in this
case; and it is affirmed.
While it is true that the Court in this case took occasion to consider
the right of an infant, if born alive, to recover for such injuries and to
hold by way of obiter that such a right did not exist, yet that was not
the basis of the decision. The reasoning in the Buel Case which
actually is the basis of the decision would seem to be sound. This, for
the reason, that a statutory enactment must be considered in the light
of the situation it is sought to remedy and with due regard to the
law then existing.
Coming now to the second subdivision of our question, namely, the
right of the infant after birth to recover for prenatal injuries due to
negligence, we find this subject has been considered in a large group of
cases and decided adverse to the right of such recovery. In Walker v.
Great Northern Ry. Co.,14 decided in 1891 (Ir. L. R. 28 C. L. 69),
this was the direct question before the Court. An infant en venire sa
mere was permanently crippled as the result of an alleged negligent ope-
ration of a train, in which the mother of the infant was also injured
as a passenger of the railroad. Said the Court in part:
As a matter of fact, when the act of negligence occurred the
plaintiff was not in esse-was not a person or a passenger or a
human being. Her age and her existence are reckoned from her
birth and no precedent has been found for this action. Lord Coke
SIr. L. R., 28 C. L. 69.
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says: 'Although filius in uter matris est pars viscerum 'matris,
yet not many cases hath consideration in respect of the apparent
expectation of his birth.' The Bedford Case, 7 Coke, 8 b. This
imputed existence in esse to an unborn child is a fiction of the civil
law which regards an unborn child as born for some (not for all)
purposes connected with the acquisition and preservation of real
or personal property. . . . Thus it would appear that according
to this fiction an unborn child may in the civil law at the same
moment be regarded as in esse and not in esse; for its own bene-
fit in esse, to its prejudice not in esse, and, unless for the benefit
of itself, not in esse. As civil law prevailed in' the ecclesiastical
and admiralty courts of chancery, most of the authority by which
an unborn child is for its own benefit regarded as born is to be
found in the decisions of these courts ..... These authorities ap-
pear to me to show that the doctrine which regards an unborn
child as born for its own benefit (which is the utmost element of the
doctrine) is a fiction adopted from the civil law by the Courts of
Equity for some, but not for all, purposes, and far more seldom
recognized in the Courts of Law. The present is and always was
a common law action for personal injuries caused by the negli-
gence or breach of duty of the defendants and it lies for the plain-
tiff to show what was this duty of the defendants towards the
plaintiff, and how it arose. 'Negligence' and 'duty' are respectively,
relative, not absolute, terms. It is not contended that duty arose
out of contract. The contract was between the defendant and
Mrs. Walker, and, so far as contract is concerned, it was to Mrs.
Walker, the defendants were liable for breach of it. If it did not
spring out of contract, it must, I apprehend, have arisen (if at all)
from the relative situation and the circumstances of the defend-
ants and plaintiff at the time of the occurrence of the act of negli-
gence. But at that time the plaintiff had no actual existence, and
was not a human being, and was not a passenger-ini fact, as Lord
Coke says, the plaintiff was then pars viscerumn matris; and we
have not been referred to any authority or principle to show that
a legal duty has ever been held to arise towards that which is not
in esse in fact, and has only a fictitious existence in law, so as to
render a negligent act, a breach of that duty.
In the case of Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, supra, decided in 1900,
the Court followed the view expressed in the Walker Case, supra. To
this decision, however, Judge Boggs dissented, handing down the follow-
ing illuminating opinion:
It may be conceded no case adjudicated at the common law can
be found wherein a plaintiff was awarded damages for injuries
inflicted upon his person while in the womb of his mother. But
an adjudicated case is not indispensable to establish a right to re-
cover under the rules of the common law. Lord Mansfield de-
clared: 'The law of England would be an absurd science were it
Washington University Open Scholarship
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founded upon precedents only.' 'Precedents,' he observed, 'were
to illustrate the principles and to give them a fixed certainty.' 1
Kent. Com. 477. In speaking of the establishment and growth
of the rights of common law, Mr. Cooley in his work on Torts
(pages 13-15) said: 'The process of growth has been something
like the following: Every principle declared by a court in giving
judgment is supposed to be a principle more or less general in its
application, and it is applied under the facts of the case, because,
in the opinion of the court, the facts bring the case within the
principle. It does not limit and confine it within the exact facts,
but it furnishes an illustration of the principle, which perhaps,
might still have been applied had some of the facts been
different. Thus, one by one, important principles become
recognized through adjudications which illustrate them and
which constitute authoritative evidence of what the law is when
other cases shall arise. But cases are seldom exactly alike in
their facts. They are, on the contrary, infinite in their diversities,
and, as numerous controversies on differing facts are found to be
within the reach of the same general principle, the principle seems
to grow and expand and does actually become more comprehensive
though so steadily and insensibly, under legitimate judicial treat-
ment that for the time the expansion passes unobserved. But new
and peculiar cases must also arise from time to time, for which the
courts must find the governing principles and these may, however,
be referred to some principle previously declared or to some one
which now, for the first time, there is occasion to apply. But a
principle newly applied is not supposed to be a new principle. On
the contrary, it is assumed that from time immemorial it has con-
stituted a part of the common law of the land and that it has only
not been applied before because no occasion has arisen for its
application.
This well reasoned dissenting opinion deals with the fiction problem
in the following manner:
At common law, actions were maintainable to recover damages
occasioned by injuries to the person of the plaintiff, whether in-
flicted intentionally or through the negligence of the defendants.
The governing principle illustrated by such cases is that the com-
mon law, by way of damages, gave redress for personal injuries
inflicted by the wrbng or neglect of another. The case disclosed
by the declaration under consideration is embraced within the limits
of the principle thus recognized, and it is clear recovery could
have been maintained at common law, unless the fact the plaintiff
was unborn when the alleged injuries were inflicted would have
operated to deny a right of action. The argument is that at
common law the unborn child is but part of the mother and had
no existence or being which could be the subject-matter of injury
to the mother; that in such case there was but one person-one
life-that of the mother. A foetus in the womb of the mother may
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol12/iss2/1
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well be regarded as but a part of the bowels of the mother during a
portion of the period of gestation; but if while in the womb it
reaches that prenatal age of viability when the destruction of the
life of the mother does not end its existence, also, and when, if
separated prematurely, and by artificial means, from the mother,
it would be so far a matured human being as that it would live
and grow mentally and physically, as other children generally, it
is but to deny a palpable fact to argue there is but one life, and that
the life of the mother. Medical science and skill and experience
have demonstrated that at a period of gestation in advance of the
period of parturition, the foetus is capable of independent and
separate life, and that, though within the body of the mother, it is
not merely a part of her body, for her body may die in all of its
parts and the child remain alive and capable of maintaining life
when separated from the dead body of the mother. If at this
period a child so advanced is injured in its limbs or members, and
is born into the living world suffering from the effects of the in-
jury, is it not sacrificing truth to mere theoretical abstraction to
say the injury was not to the child, but wholly to the mother?
Coming now to the latest case on the subject, namely, Drobner v.
Peters,"6 we find that the lower court held there could be recovery for
prenatal injuries due to negligence. But when the case reached the
Court of Appeals the doctrine announced in the Allaire Case was re-
affirmed and recovery denied. The reasoning adopted by the New York
Court is similar in this case to that of the majority opinion in the Allaire
Case.
The more these decisions denying recovery are studied the more
fallacious the reasoning therein appears. Surely there can be no de-
fense to an action of negligence that the person who was negligent did
not know he was going to injure two persons, instead of one, for, in-
deed, if such reasoning were sound, then if I negligently put a danger-
ous obstruction in a private right of way and the owner of the premises
has with him two or three guests, all of whom are injured from such
an obstruction, I, as the tort-feasor, could validly defend on the ground
I did not think any one would go over this property except the owner.
The absurdity of this is evident from a simple statement of the propo-
sition. Likewise the argument that a railroad company, in accepting
a female passenger, contracted to carry her alone and not her unborn
infant, would seem to be sophistry unworthy of serious consideration.
Surely every carrier knows that mothers carry within their wombs their
progeny. They further know that many such mothers ride on the
railroads. If then, through the negligence of the railroad, such moth-
" 184 Ill. 359.19 232 N. Y. 220.
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ers, as well as their unborn children, are injured, is it not ridiculous to
reason that the railroad did not contract to carry the unborn child?
Again it is well known that railroads carry children under the age of
five years without charge. Suppose the mother has with her a child
of one year, for whom the mother does not pay, may the railroad argue
that since the mother did not pay for this child that the child has no
recovery if injured through the negligence of the carrier? If the
matter is put on contractual grounds-which is not correct since the
contract is merely the basis for the right of the child to be where it is-
then surely the contract between the railroad and the mother of the un-
born child is as much consideration for the right of action of that child
as it is in the case of the carriage of the mother of the infant child
under the age of five years.
If the basis of these decisions were that to permit such a recovery
on the part of the infant en ventre sa mere would open the door to
fraud, the rule denying a recovery would seem to be much more valid
on the general ground of public policy. By this I mean that the num-
ber of fictitious cases would be so numerous that it would probably be
conceived by astute and unscrupulous medical and legal practitioners
without a fair chance for the defendant either to prepare or to prove
the falsity of the claim, and for that reason the unfortunate injured
infant must yield his claim for the good of the community at large.
But, after all, could not the infant be allowed such a recovery and still
the rights of the defendant be safe-guarded by making the rule that
there may be recovery by infants for injuries en venire sa mere in
negligence cases, provided the proof that such injuries were actually
due to the negligence of the defendant be clear, cogent and overwhelm-
ingly convincing.
Turning now to a consideration of the first subdivision, I find no
cases in which a child has sued at trespass for an injury to the child
resulting from wilful attack on the mother. Surely in this group of
cases, if the reasoning of Judge Boggs is sound, as I believe it to be,
there should be a right of recovery for negligent injuries-a fortiori,
there should undoubtedly be a right of recovery for wilful injuries. In
the Buel Case, supra, Judge Bond says by way of obiter: "In all the
cases the right of a mother to maintain an action for negligent injury to
herself and her unborn child is conceded." He cites no case in sup-
port of his statement, and, indeed, I find no authority which supports
this proposition. In fact, in Nugent v. R. R. Co.,17 Judge Thomas
states:
"? 154 N. Y. (App. Div.) 667.
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The fact that the child was deformed and would suffer thereby
would cause the mother mental pain, and even if she could recover
for that, the mental pain the child would suffer and the mere fact
of the deformity with its consequent dimunition of the value of
capacities and faculties could not be included in her recovery. The
father, in case he could recover at all, could do so only so far as
the injury enlarged the expense of the child's maintenance and en-
tailed loss of service. So, however the subject be viewed, there
is a residuum of injury for which compensation can not be had,
save at the suit of the child, and it is a question of grave import
whether one may wrongfully deform or otherwise injure an un-
born child without making amends to him after birth.
This would seem to be a correct statement of the law as it now ex-
ists. If this be true, then in actions of trespass for injuries resulting to
the unborn child due to wilful force applied to the mother, there should
certainly be a right of recovery-if the aim of the law to be just is to
be fulfilled. Since the law is not settled on this phase of the question
at this time, it would not require a departure from any rule now exist-
ing so to held.
On the other hand, if there is to be no recovery for the child injured
(,n ventre sa mcre either through negligence or trespass, then the obiter
of Judge Bond in the Bud Case quoted above should actually become
the law in this class of cases. The law should be consistent and hold
that the unborn child was actually a part of the mother and that it did
not have a separate personality, and then should allow the mother to
recover both for the physical injury and the mental suffering resulting
both to the mother and the child as a result of the injuries.
It is just such complex problems as are set forth in the cases dis-
cussed herein that make the law an interesting and fascinating science.
But if we do not strive to study such problems and to arrive at con-
sistent and reasonable conclusions we will surely be reminded by the
student of Matthew Green's poem, The Spleen, written in the early 18th
century-
The law grows a forest there perplex
The byways and the brambles vex:
Where the twelve verders every day
Are changing still the public way.
And if we miss the way and err,
We grievous penalties incur:
And wanderers tire and tear their skin,
And then get out where they got in.
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